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SETTING THE SALES BUDGET: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY
Abstract
This article explores how the sales budget is set in a business
organization. Findings from a longitudinal participant observation
study revealed that the sales budget is considered of great importance
to the organization as sales estimates serve as premises for planning
of production and supply and new product developments. It was
observed that the sales budget was based on a narrow, inner-directed
perspective, almost looking away from important environmental driving
forces such as competitors and customers. The findings also showed
that individuals involved in the sales budgeting process behaved
opportunistic, influencing the budgetary process and outcomes.
Theoretical and normative implications are highlighted.

INTRODUCTION
This article examines how a business organization determines its
sales budget. The sales budget is of utmost importance as it reflects
expectations about future incomes and revenues, influencing organiza-
tional planning, resource allocation and coordination activities
(Horngren 1984).
Organizations perform activities. Activities are the organiza-
tional "heartbeats" and they are costly. Due to resource dependency,
organizations have to be effective, i.e., they have to perform activi-
ties appreciated by its clients and other constituencies, explained by
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) as: "The effectiveness of an organization
is its ability to create acceptable outcomes and actions." Effective-
ness represents "an external standard of how well an organization is
meeting the demands of the various groups and organizations" (Pfeffer
and Salancik 1978, p. 11). To business organizations customers play a
predominant role. The main reason being for such organizations is
their ability to attract and serve sufficient number of clients at
prices at least covering costs. Sales budgets reflect serving organi-
zations' expectations (and hopes) regarding their effectiveness in the
marketplace.
budgets
To allocate resources, coordinate internal activities and monitor
external relationships organizations make use of plans, rules and pro-
cedures. Known to—and used by most organizations—are budgets.
Several definitions of this term are offered throughout the budgeting
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literature most of which emphasizing "plans," "activities," and
"financial resources," e.g.: "... a comprehensive plan of operations
and actions, expressed in financial terms" (Heiser, 1959, p. 3).
For an ongoing organization a budget reflects the past, as it is a
statement of the future. Hence, budgets are plans reflecting predictions
about future behaviors and outcomes. A budget reflects organizational
aspirations, it may serve as a communication device for the organiza-
tional members (and others), and may have a signaling function as well
(cf. Wildavsky 1986, pp. 7-9).
Behavioral Aspects of Budgeting
There is a vast literature on budgets and budgeting. A distinc-
tion may be made between the normative and the behavioral budgeting
literature. In the normative literature the emphasis is on how to
prepare and use budgets (cf. Horngren 1984). The human aspects of
budgeting are by and large looked away from in the normative, but is
extensively dealt with in the behavioral budgeting literature. The
behavioral literature addresses questions such as: "How do budgets
influence people?" as dealt with in Argyris ' (1952) seminal study,
who found budgets and budgeting related to several human relations
problems, and the study by Hofstede (1967) exploring how budgeting
affects managers and subordinates. The reversed question: "How do
people influence budgeting?" has also been focused on in this litera-
ture (cf. Shift and Levin 1970). A variety of topics related to this
question has been examined, such as the relationship between par-
ticipation in budgeting and performance (cf. Brownell and Mclnnes
1986), the relationship between leadership style and budgeting (cf.
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Chenhall 1986) , how budgets are used to create organizational slack
(cf. Merchand 1985; Onsi 1973), how resources are allocated (cf. Pondy
and Birnberg 1969; Pondy 1970), and how resource allocation is
influenced by political processes (cf. Pfeffer and Salancik 1974;
Wildavsky 1979).
Most behavioral budgeting research has been conducted in the con-
text of organizations "independent" of markets such as universities,
hospitals and local governments , i.e., organiazations getting their
main resources through lobbying and political processes directed
towards public bureacracies (cf. Olsen 1970; Pfeffer and Salancik
1979; Wildavsky 1979).
The Sales Budget
For market-dependent organizations such as business firms (cf.
Dill 1965) the flow of resources comes mainly from exchanges of organ-
izational outputs in markets (cf. Thompson 1967). As resources are
necessary for organizational survival and growth, the monitoring of
market relationships is assumed being of crucial importance for such
(market-dependent) organizations (cf. Kotler 1984).
Organizations often make use of many (several) budgets. In
market-dependent organizations the sales budget plays a predominant
role. When assumptions about the firm as portrayed in the situation
of "pure competition" (i.e., complete information and resource mobility)
are violated, preplanning and coordination become important to the
firm. As total sales determine level of organizational activity and
influence planning of production and supply, recruiting and training
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of personnel, it is no wonder why the importance of sales budgets is
emphasized (cf. Horngren 1984).
Any sales budget rests on some prediction of future sales. The
normative budgeting literature recognizes difficulties in predicting
sales. Various techniques and methods to cope with these difficulties
have been proposed (see Kotler 1984, chap. 7 for overview). The beha-
vioral aspects, i.e., how organizational members cope with these dif-
ficulties and influence the sales budget are overlooked in this (the
normative) literature. The behavioral-oriented budgeting literature
has only indirectly treated this question in focusing on setting of
standards and on how organizational and interpersonal variables may
influence participation in budgeting (for overview of findings see
Brownell 1982).
Conceptual Framework
Even in situations where a priori knowledge is modest—as in the
present case—the researcher holds assumptions and "hunches" that will
guide his or her inquiry. By taking such assumptions and "hunches"
directly into account also exploratory research may benefit from a
priori theorizing (Zaltman et al. 1982).
In market-dependent organiztions (i.e., business firms) the indivi-
dual members in most cases are full-time participants. They are members
to provide livelihood, and will often demonstrate career commitments
(cf. Dill 1965). Moreover, most business organizations are action
oriented, assumed watching market relationships as the monitoring
of such relationships determines organizational outcomes and oppor-
tunities for its members. Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that
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merabers of such organizations are better informed and more devoted to
organizational tasks than are part-time members in bureaucratic, non-
market organizations as reported on in most previous budgetary studies
(cf. March and Olsen 1976).
Organization members occupy various positions. Positions are
related to opportunities and obligations. The normative budgetary
literature assumes (cf. Horngren 1984)—as documented in the beha-
vioral literature—that budgeting primarily is a top- and middle-
management task (for overview see Brownell 1982). The tasks to be
budgeted such as sales may, however, influence the various organi-
zational members differently.
Organizational members may be conceived as agents contracted to
perform various tasks (cf. Pratt and Zeckhauser 1985). Often the
agent is assumed to know more about the task to be performed than
does the principal. Moreover, the agent is assumed to behave oppor-
tunistic (cf. Williamson 1979) within the limits imposed on her or him
by being an organization member (cf. March and Simon 1958, p. 90).
Thus organization members participating in budgetary activities are
assumed to take both organizational and individual goals into account
(cf. Williamson 1964). Based on the above discussion, we will intro-
duce the conceptual framework as shown in Figure i.
Insert Figure 1 about here
Figure 1 is to be read as follows: Organizational factors such as
mode of supervision, structure, rules and procedures, past experiences,
goals and expectations (1) will influence participation in budgeting,
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how the budgetary process proceeds (3) and the outcome of this process
(4). Various individual factors such as position in the organization,
knowledge, goals and expectations of participants will, however,
modify budgeting activities and outcomes (2). As the budgetary pro-
cess proceeds, information and estimates will be submitted ana
modified (3), resulting in the final sales budget (4).
CASE: ALPHA1
The Company
The Alpha Company (Ltd.) is a division in the Beta Corporation
situated in a larger city on the western coast of Norway. The company
was founded in the mid-fifties and enjoyed rapid growth during the
first decades. The main products are various types (product groups)
of flooring materials of plastics. Efficient use of the firm's produc-
tion technology requires considerable amount of pre-planning and lead-
time. At the domestic market the Alpha company holds high market
shares within this specific product category (i.e., flooring materials
of plastic). A considerable fraction of the company's production is
exported, in particular to other Nordic countries. The last ten years
the sales growth has slowed down, and when the research was conducted,
realized sales were approximately 20 percent below budgeted sales.
The case description is based on longitudinal participant
observations. The observations were conducted by one of the authors
when formally hired for four months to work as accountant/economic
consultant with the Alpha Company. The real purpose approved by
Beta's top management was, however, to study the company's budgeting
system and procedures. The observer had access to budget meetings and
relevant documents, such as budget memos, letters, reports and plans.
A detailed diary was kept covering the various events and observations.
The observations were continuously interpreted and reinterpreted during
the period of observation (Glaser and Strauss 1967).
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Management/ Organization
Alpha is headed by a MBA-educated manager (M) who was assigned the
top position in Alpha after working a few years as the company's
marketing manager. In addition to the top manager (M) , the production
(P) and marketing (MKT) manager constitute Alpha's top-management.
The marketing function is organized as a product management orga-
nization (cf. Kotler 1984), where each product group is headed by a
product manager. Two sales managers (S) are in charge of the sales
force, one for each of two regions. They are both reporting to the
marketing manager. Alpha is perceived as important for the Beta cor-
poration. The vice president (VPB)—who is the informal leader—and
the financial officer (FO) in the Beta corporation are involved in
budgeting and other activities taking place in Alpha.
Setting the Sales Budget
A memo from the financial officer dated August 17 started "this
year's" sales budgeting process, resulting in a sales budget which was
turned down by the price authorities due to proposed increases in
2
prices October 19. The sales budget was modified and finally settled
by October 21. Events and participants are listed in Figure 2.
Insert Figure 2 about here
2
All proposed increases in prices by business firms have to be
approved by the price authority in this country. This rule was intro-
duced several years ago as a device to control prices and keep down
rate of inflation.
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ANALYSES 3
In the foLlowing we will emphasize both organizational and inter-
personal factors. Numbers in parentheses refer to events listed in
Figure 2 (cf. left column).
Inspection of Figure 2 shows that Alpha posesses programs that
initiate as well as modify the budgeting process. Inspection of the
start of the budgeting process, the memo from the financial officer
(1) shows according to Starbuck (1983), that programs in Alpha
"generate actions." Or, in the words of Wilensky (1967), the Alpha
organization has "intelligence" that initiates and modifies the
budgeting process.
An interesting additional observation is the long delay between
the first signal (1) and the following request for sales estimates (2)
indicating that Alpha partly is functioning in a "reactive" way, and
that time pressure is needed to bring a task on the organizational
members' agenda as proposed by March and Simon (1958).
The reported data show, as assumed at the outset of this article,
that budgeting sales is of importance to the firm. Additional data
(not reported in Table 2) also show that estimates from the sales
budget serve as premises for planning of supply and production, and
decisions regarding new products/product modifications as well.
Inspection of Table 2 demonstrates that the various activities are
primarily related to problems/questions regarding prices and volumes.
3
The present analysis may be seen as reanalysis or sense-making
of previous observations (cf. footnote 1); i.e., the prime purposes
are interpretat ion and understanding (cf. Chua 1986).
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According to the case description, the market situation of Alpha can
be classified as oligopolistic. Inspection of the budgetary process
shows that some price reactions are assumed (15). It is, however,
evident that participants in the budgetary process are confronted with
high perceived uncertainty when it comes to "estimating" price-volume
relationships (9). An interesting observation is that they (the par-
ticipants in the budgeting process) in fact do not try to estimate
price-volume relationships, but that they rather are trying to arrive
at some "quesstimate" for prices and volumes separately!
It was initially assumed that participants involved in sales
budgeting would closely watch customers and competitors as basis for
monitoring of sales-market relationships. Inspection of the budgetary
process shows this not to be the case. In fact, Figure 2 reflects
that modest—almost no attention at all is directed towards
competitors or customers. Inspection of reports and plans (cf.
footnote 1) showed that some rough estimates of future sales had been
made, mainly based on crude economic indicators such as projected
growth in income per capita and future trends for the building
industry. Indicators representing "driving" forces in Alpha's market
environments of importance for its survival and growth, such as
consumer needs, competitors and their actions (cf. Porter 1980) were
not directly focused on by the sales budget participants.
This may be interpreted as the management of Alpha has constructed
some reality (cf. Berger and Luckman 1966), and that yesterday's
reality constructions represent the "glasses" of tomorrow. This is
in no way a new phenomenon. Levitt (1960) in his seminal article,
re-
marketing Myopia" has showed how whole industries have disappeared due
to inability to "discover" crucial environmental changes taking place.
The findings show that organizations do not always seek information
when needed nor that they use information possessed, and that infor-
mation may be used inadequately as well (cf. Feldman and March 1981).
The reported findings do also show that budgeting has a "human"
side (cf. Argyris 1952; Schiff and Lewin 1970). For example, in
negotiations on volumes (7) additional information was supplied to
"allow" the counterpart to modify his estimates and get redress as
described by Goffman in his recognized contribution, "un Cooling the
Mark Out" (1952).
The present case also shows that coercive power might be used in
budgeting (cf. (4)), where relative organizational position represents
the power base. The case description, however, also demonstrates that
organization members may oppose (3).
Inspection of price and volume estimates for the manager (M) and
the marketing manager (MRT) in Alpha is noteworthy. Why is it so that
the manager wants to escalate the price and volume estimates while the
marketing manager wants to lower these estimates? Several explanations
may be offered. As noted at the outset, employees are agents. The
marketing manager is an agent of Alpha's manager, as the manager (M) is
an agent to Beta's top management. The manager (M) has to perform, but
as shown in the above case description, realized sales are lagging
approximately 20 percent behind budgeted sales. Thus, he (M) is trying
to "buy" time; he has to demonstrate that he believes in the company as
he has to show that he believes in what he is doing. The potential
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conf rontation with sales budget deficits may later on be "explained"
by "unexpected" events such as entrance of new competitors or com-
petitors' use of dumping prices (cf. (15)). It might also be so that
the manager (M) perceives high budget estimates as a motivational fac-
tor. Unfortunately the information available is insufficient to pursue
this question to arrive at a final explanation.
For the marketing manager, however, the sales budget represents an
obligation . To him a potential sales budget deficit represents a sub-
stantially higher personal cost. A budget deficit will show that he
has "not performed well," while budget surplus might be interpreted as
"excellent performance." To him the sales budget represents the per-
formance standard according to which he is perceiving himself being
evaluated.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
One swallow does not make the summer, neither does one intensive
case study represent the whole truth. Some preliminary conclusions
may, however, be drawn from this study. The present study corroborates
what is assumed in the normative budgeting literature, and "what every
managers know," that the sales budget i_s_ important to business organ-
izations. The findings also suggest that organizations "construct"
biased images of their environments heavily influenced by past behavior
and previous expectations as reflected in recent organizational litera-
ture based on social cognition theories (cf. Kiesler and Sproull, 1982,
for overview), and that such socially constructed images may influence
sales budgeting behavior as well. The reported results do also indi-
cate as proposed by Schiff and Lewin (1970) that people may influence
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budgets. Moreover, the findings suggest that individuals involved in
organizational budgeting exhibit opportunistic behavior taking their
own interests into account to the extent this is perceived manageable
whithin the organizational context (contract). LastLy, the findings
from the present study conducted in a market-dependent business organi-
zation suggest that the individual's dependence on the organization
influences the person's attention towards budgeting activities and how
the budget may impact her or him substantially more than reflected in
past behavioral budgetary studies conducted in bureaucratic, non-market
organizations. In these studies the consequences for persons involved
(in the budgetary process) have often been negligible (cf. March and
Olsen 1976) , or the consequences may be played down as reported in a
recent study by Larkey and Smith (1984) who found government budgets to
be misinterpreted, and that "... they (the participants) explain their
budget formulations in ways that absolve them of most of their respon-
sibility" (p. 80).
The findings have normative implications as well. The fact that
organizations construct their—often biased—environments is of impor-
tance for the quality and usefulness of the organization's sales budget,
As budgeted sales guide level of activity and planning of supply and
production, efforts should be done so that predicted organizational
performance should be reflected realistically in sales budgets. This
calls for increased emphasis on "problem finding" (cf. Dillon 1982) in
order to construct relevant environmental images to "see" opportunities
and threats, to better positioning the organization so it can perform
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its best, as well as making the sales budget a relevant management
tool.
The reported findings show that people may influence budgets, but
relatively little is known how and by whom budgets are influenced.
Research is needed to assess such influences to refine budgeting
theory as basis for improving budgeting practice.
Our findings also show that organizational members exhibit oppor-
tunistic behavior, which have implications for design of incentive
structures. The relationships between incentives and budgets are
important and should be considered to make budgets what they are sup-
posed to be, i.e., useful management tools.
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Organization
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Rules /procedures
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Goals/expectations
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Interpretation
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Knowledge
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3. Information
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modifications
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4. Sales
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Figure 1. Conceptual Framework
No. Date Event
Present/
Receiver Con tent /Observation
(1) 8/17 Budget memo (I) M, P
from FO
(2) 9/15 Request from M, MKT
FO
(3) 9/15 Reply from MKT FO, M
Reminder. Proposal for master
budget for Beta. Due by middle
of October, implying that esti-
mates for sales and and con-
tributions must be proposed
by end of September.
Estimates for expected sales
for the major products needed.
Too early. M denies to give esti-
mates of sales volumes before
attending the product meeting*
next week.
(4) 9/22 Command from M, MKT
VPB
(5) 9/28 Budget memo II M, MKT,
from FO P and
other
(6) 9/28 Meeting M, MKT,
P
*Group meeting where rep-
resentatives from sales,
marketing, production and
top management discuss
assortment, product devel-
opments, design and mar-
ket expectations.
VPB orders that the sales organi-
zation shall be involved in
the sales budgeting process.**
**Due to the sales deficit,
the sales managers were not
invited to participate in
the budgeting of sales by M.
Preliminary budgets due by
October 6 to be discussed and
modified by a committee
covering all of Beta's com-
panies October 10, and final
budget not later than October
20. Only known or planned
changes in costs and prices
should be included in the
budget.
MKT proposes sales volumes.
The proposal is perceived as
too low and turned down.
(7) 9/28 Meeting M, MKT Budget for sales costs dis-
cussed and agreed upon.
Volume negotiations. P adds
and MKT reduces the volume
estimates.
(8) 9/30 Meeting M Negative reactions from M.
"The volume estimates are much
lower than last year's budget.'
"If this is the reality we
have to lay off 10 employees.
We have to do something with
this."
(9) 10/6 Meeting
(10) 10/11 Meeting
MKT, P Prices are discussed. Real-
ized prices used as baseline.
However, uncertainty regard-
ing basic information for
making the price budgeting
decisions prevails. Various
procedures for estimating
prices are discussed. M
emphasizes the need for not
overestimating the prices.
MKT, Sales
Managaers
,
Sales
Represen-
tatives
MKT presents proposed product
changes and ask. sales managers
for sales estimates by 10/17.
(11) 10/17 Meeting
(12) 10/17 Meeting
FO, M,
MKT, P
VPB, M,
MKT
FO raises the budgeted prices,
but they are modestly reduced
in the following discussion.
The volume estimates supplied
by the sales organizations
and marketing department are
compared. Volume estimates
are increased.
(13) 10/19 Revision by P The prices suggested 10/17
are raised.
(14) 10/19 Meeting VPB, M, FO Negative reaction from the
price authorities. Decide
to present two new budget
alternatives to the price
authorities.
(15) 10/12 Post-hoc
comments from
M
"The budgeted prices are the
lowest we will obtain in the
market... Due to economic
conditions, and observed
tendencies to dumping, no
increase in volume, except
for product X, is budgeted."
M = Manager
MKT = Marketing Manager
P = Production Manager in Alpha
VPB = Vice President
FO = Financial Officer in Beta
Figure 2. Events and Actors in the Sales Budgeting Process
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